boundaries separating constitutionally permissible and impermissible behavior are typically vague. Thus, important and controversial government policies are likely to engender disputes not only about their merits but also about whether the government, or a particular set of oYcials can legitimately undertake a given course of action. . . . When it validates oYcial decisions which may initially seem to many to violate the rules, a constitutional court thereby gives sanction to regime change. In refusing to validate such decisions, a court denies them its imprimatur of legitimacy. (Murphy and Tanenhaus 1968, 358-59) The requirement necessary for constitutional courts to accomplish regime change was clear: a population suYciently aware of the role of a constitutional court to permit such a court to review and legitimate changes in rules required for new policies. Yet, because of the low level of awareness within the general population of the institutional components of the relevant constitutional court (see Caldeira and Gibson 1992, fn. 5; cf. Mondak 1991 cf. Mondak , 1994 , Murphy and Tanenhaus's attractive idea of court legitimated regime change nonetheless lacked an empirically functioning mechanism for change.
Here, we argue that contemporary research on legal consciousness oVers a means to explain the role of courts in facilitating and legitimating regime changes that keep government policy consonant, to variable degrees, with transformations in material conditions and popular sentiment. The dynamic nature of legal consciousness allows courts to redeWne the formal law and the fundamental rules that have previously governed social interactions without precipitously aVecting the long-term legitimacy of the state or its political institutions. Further, popular legal consciousness allows this process to occur despite the lack of popular knowledge of the institutional components apparently required to achieve such regime change. In framing our argument, we adopt an unusual path through the literature on legal consciousness.1 More often described as a development within sociolegal scholarship, the relevance of legal consciousness-as a concept and as a body of theoretically informed empirical research-for mainstream political science has been less often explored. The extraordinary power wielded by of an unelected constitutional court within a democratic republic continues to vex political scientists and legal scholars. Recent literature on legal consciousness provides a multidisciplinary perspective that oVers new resources for addressing this long-standing dilemma. For our part, we reconceptualize regime change by beginning with an assumption of political dysfunction: an inability of the existing political system to translate a popular set of demands on a policy issue into political action (Easton 1965a (Easton , 1965b . This scenario presumes that the demand for policy change can arise independent of a commensurate shift in political power within a legislature.
Although legislators respond to the groups who exercise social inXuence, the legislature is not a perfect reXection of the social power exercised by these various groups at any moment in time. Once a group converts its social inXuence into institutionalized bases of power, these groups are able to utilize their legislative position, and the coercive power of law, to consolidate and maintain their existing political and social advantage. We propose that the sources of regime change lay in the potential diVerence between the power being exercised by a group in ongoing struggles for legislative inXuence and the institutionalized power exercised through established position, oYce, and administrative hierarchy.
Pressure for regime change occurs because the political power currently exercised by one group, and entrenched in existing laws, no longer correlates well with the current level of social inXuence that the group exercises in the larger society. The inXuence of particular social groups varies as their economic, social, or demographic resources shift. For example, by the early 1960s, white Southern Democrats exercised considerable power in the U.S. Congress and they dominated the state legislatures in the South. They also used their political power to eVectively institutionalize their preferences within existing state and federal laws. This political power, however, bore little relationship to their declining legitimacy in the face of the expanding civil rights movement. Despite its declining legitimacy, the dominant position of this group within the existing political institutions made it diYcult to dislodge them to a political status more commensurate with their social standing.
In a representative democracy, the disjuncture between institutionalized power and sociocultural status occurs predominantly in those cases where there is some systemic failure in the mechanisms for coordinating levels of social power with levels of political power. For example, the purposeful electoral disenfranchisement of African Americans in most Southern states certainly precluded the eVective political representation of the interests of these groups and is the most evident example of a purposive failure in the representative mechanisms. A similar phenomenon occurred in the case of lesbians and gays although no speciWc law proscribed their electoral involvement. As Justice Brennan noted, 'because of the immediate and severe opprobrium often manifested against homosexuals once so identiWed publicly, members of this group are particularly powerless to pursue their rights openly in the political arena ' (in Rowland v. Mad River, 470 U.S. 1009 , at 1014 , 1985 .
A constitutional court, we argue, may be able to redeWne the existing rules in order to facilitate the policies necessary to eVect regime change. Courts can recognize the claims and interests voiced by the less politically powerful group while simultaneously withdrawing institutional resources from the politically entrenched group. Constitutional courts can achieve regime change because, using law as a basis, they are able to engage the claims of the less politically powerful when other institutions are constrained by their aYliation with the politically entrenched.
Our revised version, however, does not resolve the fundamental diYculty associated with the idea of court-sanctioned regime change: according to public opinion surveys, the level of apprehension in the general population of the Court's role is apparently insuYcient to drive this process. In the next sections, we suggest that the use of public opinion data as the basis for considering the nature of regime change is Xawed to the extent that it relies on individualistic conceptions of social action and static measures of change in policy positions to explain shifts in the legitimacy provided by the court. Clearly, there are serious Xaws in public opinion measures as indicators of general support for regime change at any point in time (Althaus 2003; Zaller 1991; Zaller and Feldman 1992; Bennett 1988; Pierce and Rose 1974; Converse 1974 Converse , 1962 . The greater problem, we claim, derives from the inability of standard public opinion measures to capture the dynamic cultural processes that underwrite institutional power, legitimacy and durability, or to explain the relationship among popular opinion, policy initiatives and regime change. We turn to the notion of legal consciousness not only to explain the processes involved in these transitions, but also to reintroduce the fundamental role of legal norms as a catalyst in this process. Rather than simply relying on court action and the general level of legitimacy enjoyed by the court as an institution, we will focus on the understandings and uses of law circulating in American popular culture to explain both regime change and continuity. In their construction of regime change, Murphy and Tanenhaus (1968) divided the mechanism that precipitated the need for regime change, a change in popular opinion, from the mechanism used to legitimate the action, a change in the fundamental legal rules. Their sole focus was on the latter action of legitimation. How the population comes to the position of desiring a policy change requiring a fundamental change in the current rules is an issue Murphy and Tanenhaus never explicitly address. We deal with both. Murphy and Tanenhaus used measures of popular opinion on the assumption that only a population that understood and embraced the rule-changing role of a constitutional court would accord suYcient legitimacy to the subsequent change in rules by a constitutional court to successfully institutionalize regime change. The legitimacy bestowed on the constitutional court as an institution also attaches to the decisions, including the rule changes, issued by the court. Thus, Murphy and Tanenhaus focused on measures of support for the court and measures of popular understanding of the court's role in the political system.
Yet, for Murphy and Tanenhaus, the use of public opinion data to capture the citizenry's knowledge and understanding of the constitutional court itself was problematic. For example, they note that in 1949 only 17 percent of Americans could correctly oVer the name of 'the highest court of law in the United States' (Murphy and Tanenhaus 1968, fn. 2) . While the level of information about the highest court has presumably increased in recent years, the problem remains; a large enough cohort of individuals do not seem to possess suYcient information of the role of the constitutional court to facilitate agreement to a change in the previously accepted rules.
For their part, political scientists have largely abandoned the search for a direct link between institutional legitimacy and the legitimation function raised by the idea of regime change (Caldeira and Gibson 1992, fn. 5) . Social psychological and experimental results on courts and legitimacy (e.g. Gibson 1989; Mondak 1991 Mondak , 1994 Tyler and Rasinski 1991; Tyler and Mitchell 1994; Baird 2001 ; see also Murphy, Tanenhaus, and Kastner 1973; Tanenhaus and Murphy 1981) raise the tantalizing possibility of such a link although political scientists have refocused their eVorts on measures of diVuse support to consider how the general population views constitutional courts (e.g. Caldeira 1986; Gibson 1992, 1995; Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998) . According to Easton (1965a, 273; see Caldeira and Gibson 1992, 637) , diVuse support can be characterized as a 'reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the eVects of which they see as damaging to their wants.' Such support is more amorphous; for empirical research, it has often been translated and operationalized as 'trust' (e.g. Tyler 1998), 'satisfaction' (e.g. Tyler and Mitchell 1994), or 'institutional commitment' (e.g. Caldeira and Gibson 1992, 638) . Interestingly, these measures of diVuse support often implicitly or explicitly conXate it with legitimacy. Nonetheless, the idea of court-sanctioned regime change is also not well supported by this more capacious notion of diVuse support. For example, Caldeira and Gibson (1992, 636) 'Wnd no connection between support for speciWc policies and diVuse support for the Supreme Court. Instead, broad political values-commitment to social order and support for democratic norms-do a good job of predicting attitudes toward the Supreme Court. ' As it currently stands, we are left with the fact that public opinion data appears either unable to support the idea of court-sanctioned regime change or, more likely, unable to measure eVectively the complex individual and social mechanisms the concept is meant to capture (e.g. Bourdieu 1990, 125) . Contemporary research has addressed some of these persistent dilemmas by shifting the conceptual framing. In this work, the importance of the constitutional court in regime change, and in general, is explored through studies of the role of law and courts in daily lives of ordinary citizens rather than surveys of support for particular policies or institutions at speciWc times. Recent scholarship also shows that the public's apprehension and evaluation of issues and institutions can be, and often is, shaped by circulating cultural tropes and metaphors, as well as popular media and 'opinion leaders.' From more recent studies of the role of law in everyday life, we can begin to craft an alternative construction of regime change based upon legal consciousness. This concept oVers the means to recognize the relationship among and shifts within popular understandings of law, courts, and regime change. . Studies of legal consciousness seek to trace the meaning and power of law, not in the acts and decisions of constitutional courts, but in the acts and decisions of ordinary citizens and oYcial legal agents as they go about their work and lives. Ewick and Silbey argue that the rule of law is 'an emergent feature of social relations rather than an external apparatus acting upon social life. As a constituent of social interactions, the law-or what [they] call legality-embodies the diversity of the situations out of which it emerges and that it helps structure ' (1998, 17) . Thus legality, as a structure of social action, includes decisions to drive on the right side of the road in the U.S. but on the left in Australia and Japan, to threaten litigation when a neighbor's dog overturns one's garbage, to Wle workmen's compensation and disability claims when injured on the job, to exchange drivers' licenses and auto registration documents when in an accident, to seek a patent for an invention, to write a will in order to transfer property to charities after death, to complain about litigious citizens, to watch Court TV, as well as myriad decisions by administrative agencies, local magistrates, state or federal legislatures and the U.S. Supreme Court.
In studies of legal consciousness, individuals and their varied social interactions are key elements constituting the power and legitimacy of legal institutions. Persons are not, however, conceived of as carriers of speciWcally targeted opinions and political directives for representative government, but rather as agents of legal continuity, change, and legitimacy as they perpetuate, invent, or resist cultural tropes, concepts, and interpretations that invoke political and legal associations. In every social interaction, individuals are behavioral and cognitive participants in the social production (and reproduction) of cultural schemas; people's verbal and corporeal expressions reinforce incrementally, transform existing, or begin the process of inventing and accepting new schema. In concert with others, people implicitly construct or reconstruct everyday in multiple arenas and in multiple, often contradictory, forms the meanings we attribute to law, rules, power, and authority. Yet, few of these transactions or meanings are exclusively legal, or political.
In this account, 'legal consciousness . . . consists of mobilizing, inventing, and amending pieces of these schemas' that refer to law and legality (Silbey 2005, 349) . Since the construction and transmission of legal consciousness occur through myriad social transactions, many of which may not appear at Wrst to have anything to do with law, individuals' thoughts and behavior are relevant only when aggregated and circulated through common or shared social meanings. 'Law and legality achieve their recognizable character as 'the rule of law', despite the diversity of constituent actions and experiences . . . because individual transactions are crafted out of a limited array of generally available cultural schemas. These few but generally circulating schemas are not themselves Wxed or immutable, but are also constantly in the making through local invocations and inventions' (Silbey 2005 , 347 referencing Ewick and Silbey 1998).
The concept of legal consciousness oVers conceptual and theoretical advantages to the analysis of the relationships among regime change, public opinion and legitimacy. Unlike surveys of public opinion surveys, studies of legal consciousness do not focus on exclusively legal or political expression to understand legal authority and legitimacy. In other words, they do not focus so closely to the surface of what is to be explained, or rely entirely on what is explicitly articulated and selfconscious. Instead, research on legal consciousness (e.g. Sarat 1990; Yngvesson 1993) proposes that propagation and perpetuation of cultural schemas are so embedded in everyday social transactions that individuals often fail to appreciate the normally seamless diVusion through each and every social exchange. 'Law is powerful, and rules everyday life because its constructions are uncontroversial and have become normalized and habitual. Law's mediations have been sedimented throughout the routines of daily living, helping to make things move around in more or less clear ways, without having to invoke, display, or wield its elaborate and intricate procedures, especially its ultimate, physical force' (Silbey 2005) . Thus, we defer to traYc lights, wear seat belts, read warning labels on appliances, and follow instructions on pharmaceutical products. These legally-mandated communications are so routinized that we no longer recall the struggles that produced the speciWc legal regulations and the required language. Although there are may be some who still see each one of these as a sign of a continuing political battle, the legal content is usually buried within concerns about health, safety, or prudence.
The gradual or incremental transformation of meanings and the status associated with an activity, such as where or how to drive a car, or a group, such as lesbians or African Americans, may occur without individual or collective awareness of the scope of the transition until after new signs and new norms have overtly emerged and are openly contested culturally and politically. The slow emergence of modiWcations in cultural schemas through everyday social exchange may help to explain why it is often impossible for survey research that asks a direct question about support for speciWc policies to eVectively capture the comprehensive nature of a transition in an individual's understanding. Individuals may not recognize the extent to which their interpretive schemas have been reconWgured because the shifts occur through myriad conventional, unusually unproblematic and unreXective transactions. The taken-for-granted norms of everyday transactions reinforce the correctness and legitimacy of the new position at each stage of the process and, as individuals engage in social exchange, they are complicitous, without planning or intention, in fostering sociocultural changes. Because law's 'meanings and uses echo and resonate with other common phenomena' (Ewick and Silbey 1998, 17) through shared words and metaphors (LakoV and Johnson 1980) , legality is often only one among many institutional beneWciaries of the schema that comprise social transactions, making it particularly diYcult to recognize gradual transitions in interpretations relevant to assessments of a speciWc institution or policy or law. Thus, the survey researchers' eVorts to locate speciWc and measurable attitudes about particular issues fail to capture the extent to which individuals may have collectively transformed their understanding of the acceptability of the current rules.
This disjuncture between articulated opinions of individuals and collective cultural shifts may explain why some social movements often appear to burst onto the public scene without any apparent prelude. For their part, surveys usually begin to record the articulated attitudes of individuals only when policy issues are already politically contested or, even at the time when constitutional courts are already engaged in regime change. For example, the Gallup poll did not ask a question about the legalization of same-sex marriage until March 1996, when a state court ruling in Hawaii was imminent (Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235, 1996 Wve years after the case was Wled (Eskridge 2002) , three years after the Hawaii Supreme Court Wrst commented on the issue (in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 1993) , and twenty-Wve years after the Wrst cases were Wled on this same issue in state courts (Barclay and Fisher 2006) . In this example, the circulation and aggregation of the new interlaced meanings of marriage, romantic commitment, sex, sexuality, state action, and privacy seemed to have long preceded the recognition of these transformations in survey measures of public attitudes. This is evidenced in the fact that lesbian and gay relationships began to be socially acknowledged prior to any changes in legal status of these relationships (e.g. Hull 2003) .
The method of cognitive/cultural diVusion inherent in legal consciousnessthrough ordinary, everyday social transactions-also allows us to understand the means by which the status and legitimacy of an idea can be transformed while the political power of an opposing group may remain dominant and eVective. The transformation of old narratives and the invention of new schema through everyday transactions undermines the social power of some groups, and supports the growing power of challenging groups. Eventually, the growing inXuence of the challenging group may aggregate at the cultural level to underwrite a transition in the current rules. Very importantly, the process of inventing and accepting new schema incrementally through ordinary exchange, media, and habit means that social norms and expectations may be transformed even as rules, formal laws, and oYcers continue to support exercises of power in a contrary direction. Legality as enacted and propagated through social transaction need only be loosely tied to the position of formal law and it may directly challenge it (Ewick and Silbey 1998, 2003) . In fact, the strongest statements of formal law may occur at points where there is overt contestation over the existing policy because social norms and legal rules are no longer consonant. The decay in norms, and the failure of formerly accepted actions and ideas to be conventionally reproduced brings into prominence the power inherent in legal authority and action. As the current political conWguration tries to reassert the authority of these decaying norms, the disjuncture among political, legal authority and cultural norms becomes explicit.
This scenario is the setting for regime change: a portion of the population no longer enacts the current rules even as the current political conWguration presses for enforcement of those rules. The subsequent change in rules in a regime change is an indication or prediction of the impending transition in political power to a new conWguration representing the emerging social consensus. Similarly, the push for change in a few key policy areas is just one means of signaling that the transition is underway to new social understanding of a previously outlawed activity or previously marginalized group. Desegregation of educational facilities and the prohibition of laws restricting interracial marriage, for example, represented a recognition that a new approach to race had already catalyzed in popular legal consciousness.
Once we conceptualize legal consciousness as participation in the construction of schemas concerning law and legal institutions, we can also understand what has often been interpreted in survey research as inconsistent and contradictory among the mass populace and between mass and elite public opinion. Consider for example Caldeira and Gibson's (1992) study in which they note a divergence between members of the general public and 'opinion leaders' in the etiology of support for the Supreme Court. The mass public does not condition its support, Caldeira and Gibson suggest, on the Court's satisfaction of their policy or ideological preferences; but opinion leaders' support seems to rest on congruence in policy and principle. In their data, one is more likely to Wnd that mass opinion may not be aligned with a regime change while the populace still voices support for the Court: elite support is conditioned on the extent of ideological agreement, eliminating the vexing disjuncture between the regime changes and mass public opinion.
The discussion of hegemony in the research on legal consciousness also helps explain Caldeira and Gibson's Wndings that elite opinion leaders have more informed, consistent, and ideologically nuanced understandings of institutions and issues and condition their support on the basis of these views, while the mass public does not condition its support for the court on the basis of policy agreements. The concept of hegemony is, Silbey (1998, 287) writes, 'to refer to those circumstances where representations and social constructions are so embedded' in normal social transactions and culture 'as to be almost invisible.' Research on legal consciousness emerged in the 1980s and 1990s speciWcally to explain the willingness of citizens in representative democracies to support legal institutions that did not seem to live up to their announced ambitions of equal justice, nor reliably support the self-articulated interests of the mass public, just those dilemmas Caldiera and Gibson's research identiWed. The analytic concept of hegemony helps scholars to describe the ways in which popular and elite opinion may vary, and the mechanisms in popular culture that sustain these systematic diVerences.
In the legal consciousness literature, the term hegemony is used to refer to situations where 'both the sources of power and the forms of subordination are buried. In these transactions, no one seems to be demanding obedience, and subordinate parties appear to be normally socialized rather than compliant. . . . Social actors are thus constrained without knowing from where or whom the constraint derives' (Ewick and Silbey 2003; cf. Ewick and Silbey 1995; Silbey 1998; Haltom and McCann 2004; Silbey 2005) . In this research, power is enacted when some actors are able to shape the schemas and narratives that relatively powerless individuals subsequently help to perpetuate. The degree of power that can be exercised in the construction and diVusion of narratives within cultural schema is rarely total and most often contested, but it may nevertheless extend to the potential for cultural hegemony. In the literature on legal consciousness, hegemony is evidenced in an absence: in 'struggles that are no longer active, where power is dispersed through social structures and meanings are so embedded that representational and institutional struggles are no longer visible' (Silbey 2005, 333) .
What Pierson (2000, 252) calls path dependence, 'the causal relevance of preceding stages in a temporal sequence,' may also help us to understand the hegemonic potential of common cultural schemas and legal narratives. The framing, invocation, and alteration of narratives and cultural schemas are shaped by prior social understandings and currently accepted norms. Opinion leaders adjust their actions, representations, and metaphors to Wt within recognized cultural schema and diVuse new narratives in response to old criteria (see Strathern 2005, LakoV and Johnson 1980) .2 These paths allow the purposeful reproduction of political and cultural frames over extended periods, which marginalize certain groups and/or denigrate certain ideas to the advantage of others. But, those same invocations also structure resistance to this marginalization. 'Since power is exercised through the patterned distribution of resources and schemas, if there is resistance to this power it must also operate through the appropriation of these selfsame structures' (Ewick and Silbey 2003, 1335; 1995) .
Finally, adopting the lens of legal consciousness to understand regime change unites the mechanisms of change and legitimacy, the critical link lacking in public opinion survey measures of popular legal knowledge and institutional legitimacy. That legal consciousness is embedded in and reproduced by everyday social interactions-many of which have nothing to do with law or political institutions-is an important source of its ability to legitimate news stories and other political reports, especially those consistent with existing cultural schema. As noted, the correctness or rightness of a view is reaYrmed with every repetition in each new social interaction. But, recognizing the pervasive, overlapping, nonexclusive content of commonplace cultural schemas in legal consciousness should not lead us to discount the role of the law and legality in processes of legitimation. The privileged role of law and legality in constructing social meaning (Smart 1989; ComaroV and ComaroV 1991; Ewick and Silbey 1995) and its implicit or explicit structuring of so many of social interactions, enables legal institutions to use rules, laws, and social norms to move between old and new political conWgurations. Beginning with a classic account of the role of the Supreme Court in American politics, we have tried to show how the institutional authority of the Court is better understood when approached through a theory of legal consciousness. This eVort to synthesize heretofore divergent literatures-models of court-legitimated regime change, surveys of public opinion, empirical studies of legal consciousnesssuggests theoretical and empirical routes for future research.
We urge greater attention to pragmatism's theories of action and what sometimes is called theories of practice (Dewey 1957 (Dewey [1922 (Dewey ], 1929 GoVman 1967; Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1979 Giddens , 1986 Connell 1987; Sewell 1992; Emirbayer 1997, 287) . For nearly two centuries, social theorists have debated the mechanisms of social cohesion and change. Too often the discussion has focused on methodological techniques, mistakenly dividing scholars by mode of data collection (quantitative versus qualitative; surveys versus interviews or observation), slighting both important theoretical distinctions and the grounds of conceptual convergence. The desire to collect reliable and valid information about human action may have too quickly sacriWced the essential question: what constitutes the social (Latour 2005) . Research on legal consciousness has attempted to contribute to these fundamental questions by focusing on the mechanisms by which action is always transactional, never the possession, product, or indicator of an individual alone, and always part of an ongoing assembly, of slow accretion, sedimentation, and institutionalization of memes, transactional practices, and organizational forms experienced collectively as social institutions, such as the family, a court, or the rule of law. Importantly, the mechanisms of aggregation, coagulation, or what Latour (2005) calls reassembling, are neither simply additive nor multiplicatous. These mechanisms do not impose an intellectual's model of mind where command of information creates status and contradiction is discrediting, and where being human is understood primarily in intellectuals' terms. Research on legal consciousness neither assumes a rational actor nor sets it as a standard. Nor does the literature we have been reviewing assume the premises and virtues of representative democracy as institutionalized within a particular governmental structure or regime. Rather, we understand action as part of temporally unfolding sequences of perception and impulse, mediated by habit and yet enabling imaginative revision or intelligence. As Dewey wrote, ' 'present' activity is not a sharp knife-blade in time. The present is complex, containing within itself a multitude of habits and impulses' (Dewey 1957 (Dewey [1922 , 281). More productive analyses of the citizen's participation in constructing institutional legitimacy and regime change would draw from this rich pool of theoretical insight, eschewing the narrowly conceived models of mind and action that have proved less than fruitful in advancing institutional understanding and have been so diYcult to reconcile theoretically. Instead, we should build our analyses of law and legal institutions with the recognition that they are forever in the making, using what is at hand, revisable and sometimes unexpected, yet also comfortably familiar and habituated.
